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Abstract
Nepal has seen a significant reduction in poverty over the period 1995–2010 which encom-
passes the decade-long Maoist-led civil war. So was the post-conflict provision of economic
resources to districts related to their involvement in promoting the Maoist cause? We tackle
this question combining theory and empirics. Our model predicts that poorer districts are
more likely to support the Maoists and in return they get promised economic gains condi-
tional on the Maoists prevailing post-conflict. Combining data on conflict with consumption
expenditure data from the Nepal Living Standards Survey and data on foreign aid, we test
these predictions. Our panel data estimates and our cross-sectional analysis consistently find
strong support for our hypotheses. These are confirmed by the IV analysis that we perform
at the panel level.
JEL codes: D74, D78, O20
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1 Introduction
Civil wars have been studied by academics from various disciplines and from many different
angles. Given that civil wars have persisted over centuries in this world and have affected
millions of lives, this attention is quite justified. According to Miguel, Satyanath, and
Sergenti (2004), the toll civil wars have taken dwarf the casualties exacted by inter-state
wars since World War II. Even though sub-Saharan Africa has borne the brunt of civil wars
for decades now, this phenomenon is by no means restricted to that area. In recent years,
several countries in Asia too have witnessed civil conflict. We study the decade-long Maoist
uprising in Nepal (1996–2006) which eventually culminated in the abolition of monarchy in
2008 and brought the left parties considerable success in the elections that followed. Clearly,
this civil war resulted in strengthening multi-party democracy and reducing the erstwhile
powerful monarch to a titular head.
We are interested in studying the economic implications of civil conflict. In particular, our
interest is in the fortunes of different groups subsequent to the cessation of the civil war
and how it may be connected to their participation in the conflict. The civil conflict in
Nepal is a context amenable to studying such issues especially given that the challenger (the
Maoist group) achieved a large degree of political power after the hostilities ended. The
questions which interest us are: (i) Which groups tend to participate more in conflict? (ii)
Are they rewarded in a manner commensurate with their efforts? In other words, was there
an implicit quid pro quo? Nepal witnessed a large reduction in poverty levels over the period
1995-2010. However, the reduction was far from uniform across the districts.2 Given that
this period roughly coincides with the duration of the civil war and the subsequent joining of
the Maoist parties in the government, can one link this differential poverty reduction to the
putative “rewards” story? (iii) Do the observed patterns of poverty and inequality shed light
on the challenger’s objective? Specifically, does the new government behave in a clientelistic
manner or more like a benevolent social planner?
We attempt to answer such questions by combining theory with empirical analysis. In
our model, there are three key sets of actors: the Maoist group, the king and the citizens
of the nation. The citizens are partitioned into groups which may be thought of social,
income or occupational categories. The main feature is that the groups have different income
distributions; so they can be ranked in terms of average incomes. In this way we are able to
isolate the interplay between group-level income and conflict. The game proceeds as follows.
First, the Maoists decide whether or not they want to challenge the regime. If they do
challenge, then both the Maoist group and the king simultaneously decide on how hard to
fight. Specifically, the Maoist group promises (non-negative) transfers to the various groups
which are to be delivered to them only if the Maoist group prevails in the conflict. Thus,
these transfers are the “rewards” conditional on a Maoist victory. These transfers are to be
2See e.g. Mitra (2016).
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financed out of a budget whose control lies with the head of the government. The idea is
that once the Maoists win the power of the king will be heavily curtailed and the country
will move to democracy.
The king can use his finances to buy effort from his army to combat the rebels.3 The extent
of military effort has the ability to affect the final outcome of conflict.4 Faced with these
choices, the groups then decide individually and simultaneously on their supply of effort for
the Maoists. Of course, choosing to supply zero effort is possible and is interpreted as not
supporting the Maoists.5
We impute two very different objective functions, in turn, to the Maoists. First, we assume
that the Maoists are aiming to maximise private gains — so they try to “purchase” conflict
efforts from the various groups as economically as possible. In the other scenario, we assume
that the Maoists are entirely motivated by welfare concerns; here, they promise transfers as a
benevolent social planner would. Their aim is to maximise some form of a Benthamite social
welfare function. We show that poorer groups contribute more effort to support the Maoists
regardless of the motivations of the Maoists.6 This is without any assumption of ideological
affinities between them and the Maoists. Moreover, they do so even when they are promised
lower transfers — in absolute terms — as compared to their rich counterparts (in the case
where the Maoists behave opportunistically). Next, we show that there is an implicit lower
bound on how “cheaply” the poorer groups can be bought (in this “opportunistic Maoists”
case) so that they turn out to be gainers in a relative sense. This aspect of conflict-based
reward is what we try to establish empirically. Additionally, the two different motivations
for the Maoists bear different implications in terms of movements in poverty and inequality.
We use our empirical analysis to test which of the two motivations obtains greater validation.
Using data on conflict, data on consumption expenditure from the Nepal Living Standards
Survey (NLSS) and foreign aid data, we created a district-level panel. We have data on
consumption expenditure for the pre-conflict period from the NLSS-I (conducted during
1995-96) and for the post-conflict period we use the third wave of NLSS that was conducted
in 2010-11. We combine these with data on projects financed through foreign aid. These
projects are mainly for the purpose of a district’s infrastructural and economic development.
This is what we primarily use as our measure for transfers (“rewards”) to districts.
3Think of this army as a private one who must be maintained at some expense to the king. Of course,
the upkeep of such an army may be financed by taxes on the districts; but then again this is money which
the king could potentially “consume” himself but chooses not to and implicitly uses it to “pay” his army.
The King of Nepal had mobilized about 80,000 Royal Nepalese Army with the aim of ending the Maoist
insurgency (see Sharma (2006)).
4This role of the incumbent (king) is similar in spirit to that of the political incumbent in Caselli and
Tesei (2016) where s(he) is allowed to choose the degree of political contestability by deciding how much to
spend on vote-buying, bullying, or outright repression.
5We assume (as is standard) that the outcome follows from a contest success function whose inputs are
the aggregate conflict contributions from each side (the king and the Maoists).
6This is consistent with several empirical studies on Nepal cited below.
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Using these data and performing both panel level and cross-sectional analysis, we consistently
find that districts which experienced higher levels of conflict during the decade-long Maoist
war were more likely to have a greater number of foreign aided projects in years after the
war even when controlling for the district-level poverty rate. Our results survive a series of
robustness checks: alternative measures of conflict, of poverty, of inequality. We split the
projects into seven broad categories and separately examined the results for each category.
By and large, these sectoral regressions re-iterate our main findings.
We also conduct a Two-Stages Least Squares (IV) analysis to check the robustness of our
findings. It is argued that one of the important sources of funds for the Maoists came from
the control of timber smuggling to India. We exploit this channel in terms of developing
an instrument for our conflict measure(s) at the district level. The ecology (specifically, the
elevation and vegetation) varies considerably across the different districts of Nepal. How-
ever, the type(s) of timber a district can offer is clearly a time-invariant entity. However, the
prices of these — in India — do vary over time. Thus, a weighted index of these prices at
the district-level — where the weights come from the proportion of the district vegetation
falling into one of the ecological categories — would be a measure of the funding sources of
the Maoists from the district at a point in time. Insofar the price movements in timber in
India are independent of the aid disbursements/targetted transfers in Nepal (our outcome
variables), such a weighted index would be exogenous and hence allow for improved identi-
fication of the effects. The results from our IV analysis re-enforces and in fact strengthens
our basic findings.
All in all, our empirical results strongly corroborate with our theoretical predictions. More-
over, we cannot discern any effect of conflict-proneness on either poverty or inequality —
this suggests that the motivations of the Maoists appear closer to those of the opportunis-
tic/clientelistic agent rather than that of the benevolent planner.
Our work relates in different ways to several strands of the relatively recent but growing
literature on conflict.7 It adds to the literature on the relationship between economic condi-
tions and warfare (see e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Bates, Greif, and Singh (2002),
Chassang and Padro-i Miquel (2009), Esteban and Ray (1999), Esteban and Ray (2008),
Gawande, Kapur, and Satyanath (2012), Grossman (1991), Grossman and Kim (1995), Hir-
shleifer (1991), Skaperdas (1992)). In terms of linking the budget size to conflict intensity our
model speaks to the conflict and state capacity issue raised by Fearon and Laitin (2003).8
Our model shares some similarities with Besley and Persson (2010) who study why weak
states are often plagued by civil disorder which reinforce low investments in legal and fiscal
capacity.9 In focussing on foreign aid and conflict, our paper relates to Dube and Naidu
7See the survey by Blattman and Miguel (2010) for an overview of the literature on civil wars.
8They argue that the main routes that link poverty and civil war are low repressive capabilities resulting
from weak armies and bad road connectivity.
9In a related paper, Besley and Persson (2011) study which political and economic factors drive one-sided
or two-sided violence (repression as opposed to civil war). Powell (2004) approaches the issue of how power
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(2015) who find that US military assistance leads to differential increases in attacks by
paramilitaries in Colombia.
Our result concerning poorer districts supplying more effort for the Maoists resonate with
Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998, 2001, 2002) who argue that civil wars are essentially driven by
poor economic opportunities. Like Dube and Vargas (2013) and Mitra and Ray (2014), we
touch upon the “opportunity cost effect” and “rapacity effect” albeit from a slightly different
standpoint. Lind, Moene, and Willumsen (2014) examine the effect of conflict on illegal
activities like opium production in the context of Afghanistan. They argue that conflict
affects general lawlessness in states where instituions are weak and this induces farmers to
switch from foodgrain cultivation to crops (like opium) which may be illegal but provide
ready money. Like in our paper, they too focus on how conflict affects incentives.
Our paper shares certain similarities with papers which focus on Nepal, particularly, Do
and Iyer (2010), Acharya (2009), Gates and Murshed (2005), Bohara, Mitchell, and Nepal
(2006) and Bohara, Gawande, and Nepal (2011). Acharya (2009) finds geography and the
history of political activism to be relevant for violence. Gates and Murshed (2005) find a
strong association between the Gini and conflict. Bohara, Gawande, and Nepal (2011) find
strong evidence that greater inequality escalates deadly violence. However, it matters how
one measures inequality: polarization turns out to be the more persistent type of inequality
causing conflict. Sharma (2006) states that the failure of development efforts in Nepal
contributed to a rise in poverty and rural-urban inequality. This, in turn, fueled frustration
among the disadvantaged youth in the rural and remote areas, leading to the eruption of the
civil war. In sum, these studies provide evidence on variables associated with the origin and
escalation of Maoist violence in Nepal; this feature distinguishes them from our work which
tries to identify the effects of conflict on resource allocation.
De Juan and Pierskalla (2016) investigate the role of violence in shaping the trust citizens
have in their national government. They utilise geo-referenced survey data joined with village
level information on civil war casualties to estimate the effects of exposure to violence on
political trust in Nepal. They uncover that exposure to violence matters for reducing trust
in the national government. Libois (2016) poses a question which is close to ours in some
ways. He looks at the short and medium term consequences of the Nepalese civil war on
rural households livelihoods and on the inter-group distribution of income. He finds that in
the short-run all households lose, but high castes by a larger extent. However, high castes
diversify their income sources, notably by relying on migration, which allows them to recover.
He does not explore the political-economy mechanism which we seek to emphasize: namely,
the strategic role of conflict in diverting resources across districts ex-post.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model
designed to address our main questions. Section 3 describes the data, the empirical strategy
is used inefficiently (e.g., by means of open conflict as opposed to peaceful bargaining) when information is
complete. Our setup also involves complete information though bargaining is not an option for the players.
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and findings and Section 4 concludes. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
2 Theory
2.1 Basic Setup
Prior to the Maoist conflict, the de facto head of the government was the monarchy. The
political history of Nepal confirms this.10 We denote the incumbent head of government by
K (for ‘King’). The potential challenger is the Maoist group, denoted by M . Let the entire
country be partitioned into N groups (social/income/occupation) where N ≥ 2. The income
distribution is allowed to vary across these groups; in particular, let yi denote the average
income in group i. One should think of yi as being net of taxes. The groups are assumed
to be identical in all other respects. This abstraction is simply in order to bring certain
links — specifically those between the economic status of a group, it’s participation in the
Maoist conflict, and the subsequent allocation of funds for reconstruction post-conflict —
into sharper focus.
Why do either K or M want to stay at the helm of the government? We take the position
that there are “rents” from holding office. These rents may take the shape of economic gains
made possible from holding the reins of power. Specifically, there is an amount of money
B which can be thought of as funds which can be allotted to the various groups for their
economic development. However, it is also possible to appropriate a part or the whole of B
by the incumbent ruler. Where does this B come from? It is partly arising out of the public
funds raised by the incumbent government through taxation and part of it may come from
foreign investors/donors.
The game proceeds in three stages.
Stage 1: M decides whether or not to initiate a nationwide uprising/conflict against K.
10In 1951, late King Tribhuvan brought democracy to Nepal. Then, two major political parties – Nepali
Congress Party and the Communist Party of Nepal – emerged and they forced the King to declare parlia-
mentary elections leading to the establishment of the first democratically elected government in 1959. With
the death of King Tribhuvan, his son late King Mahendra overthrew the democratically elected government,
curtailed political freedom and outlawed opposition parties by restoring a single party system known as the
Panchayat System in December 1960. Under this system, the King kept all executive powers and people
around him enjoyed privileges which promoted lack of transparency and favoritism. The late King Birendra,
who came to the throne after the death of his father King Mahendra in 1972, continued with the Panchayat
System until the political agitation of the late 1980s which forced him to give way to a multi-party democracy
in 1990 and became a constitutional monarch. With the re-instatement of multiparty democracy, people’s
expectations rose and there was widespread perception that they will have a fair go in the democratic process.
Unfortunately, due to institutionalization of corruption, nepotism, and favoritism these expectations were
not met as power was still concentrated in the hands of the King and his coterie. While the civil conflict
was under way, the King sacked the democratically elected government twice in just over two years, and on
February 1, 2005 he took over as the head of government (see e.g, Sharma (2006)).
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Formally, M chooses an action a where a ∈ {C,NC}; here C denotes ‘conflict’ and NC
denotes ‘no conflict’. If a = NC then the game ends and everybody gets their default or
peace payoffs (stated below). Otherwise, we move to the next stage.
Stage 2: Here both M and K move simultaneously. Here, M promises an allocation x ≡
(x1, ..., xN) to each of the N groups from the funds B were K to be deposed and replaced
by M at the end of the conflict. Note, xi ≥ 0 for each i ∈ {1, .., N}. Here K chooses the
extent of military resistance to the conflict, denoted by RK ≥ 0.11
Stage 3: In this stage, each group decides on how much support, if any, to provide to the
Maoist side in the conflict. We assume that within each group there is a “leader” who decides
on the allocation of resources for the conflict.12 Call this allocation ri which again must be
non-negative. It is the sum of these individual group-level contributions that make up the
total resources in favor of M . Call it RM . The outcome of the conflict is realized based on
RM and RK and everybody gets the “conflict payoffs” which are described below.
2.1.1 Interpretation of conflict.
Before proceeding further it is important to state as what we mean by the term“conflict” in
our setup. Conflict should be viewed as a channel to bring about a change in the form of
government; it is not a mere change in the identity of the head of the government. If the
Maoists are able to win the conflict, then monarchy would be abolished (thereby curtailing
K’s influence on governance to a significant degree). The following quote from Sharma
(2006) affirms this:
“The declared aim of the Maoists is to wipe out the bureaucratic-capitalist class and state,
uproot semi-feudalism, and drive out imperialism.”
Notice, there is no guarantee that the Maoists will actually win the elections after emerging
victorious in the conflict. So their promises of transfers xi to group i can be interpreted in
the following way. These xi’s are implicit campaign promises by M who the group-members
believe are going to contest in the elections were M to win the conflict. To be sure, these
transfers by M are geared towards mobilising support for them in the conflict and not
designed to get the most votes necessarily — more on this shortly.
We assume that the transfers announced by M are credible. This seems plausible for the
following reason. It is true that potentially the transfer schedule x is not optimal from a
purely electoral perspective.13 Hence, M would have an incentive to deviate (post-conflict)
from the announced transfer schedule x to say x′ where the latter schedule targets the
11K is not allowed to make promises of transfers like M . The underlying reason being that K ′s offer of
transfers at this stage lack credibility, given that K has been a long-standing incumbent.
12This is basically to avoid any free-rider issues. This assumption of a leader or a median voter to
circumvent free-riding possibilities is standard in the conflict literature (see e.g., Esteban and Ray (2008)).
13We are grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting this point.
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electorally important groups more efficiently. However, all agents being rational can foresee
this and hence the conflict support will be jeopardised. Therefore, to actually topple K,
M must not renege from the promised transfer schedule x. In a sense, one could say that
M cares about its reputation: by not reneging on the original promise, M builds a “good”
reputation. This is important for M especially if it is keen to perpetuate its grip on power.
The idea that reputational concerns drive commitment derives from the (unmodelled) pos-
sibility of repeated interaction between the players which is similar to that in probabilistic
voting models. In these models, the voters trust the parties to deliver on their promised
platforms as not doing so damages the latter’s credibility for future elections. In our model,
M not delivering on the original promise would erode any faith the voters would have in
subsequent elections. Hence, a far-sighted M will not renege.
2.1.2 Peace payoffs.
In case there is no conflict, i.e., M chooses NC in stage 1, then all players get their default
payoffs. M gets a payoff of 0. All the groups obtain their respective incomes; so group i gets
yi for each i ∈ {1, .., N}.
For K, the default payoff is the sum of two parts: one is W > 0 which can be thought
as previously accumulated wealth.14 The other part comes from a portion of B which K
appropriates systematically in the face of no potential threats to his authority. Call this ψB
for some ψ ∈ (0, 1).
2.1.3 Conflict payoffs.
The outcome of the conflict, provided M chooses C in stage 1, is determined by a standard




for RM +RK > 0. In case RM +RK = 0 the outcome follows from a lottery whose odds are
public information.
Therefore, the expected payoff to a district i in a conflict is given by:
[yi(1− ri)](1−σ)
1− σ + pxi
where σ ∈ (0, 1). Thus M effectively “purchases” conflict effort ri by promising xi. By
construction, ri lies in the unit interval. The idea is that each group has one unit of time
14In a truly dynamic setting with multiple periods, this would presumably be dependent on B from the
earlier periods.
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endowment which can be used for income-generating activities or for conflict. Hence, ri
is the fraction of time devoted to the Maoist cause. We define RM to be the aggregate
contribution, once we sum over all the N groups. RK is the time spent by the military on
resisting conflict.
Observe, RM determines the chances of M ’s victory. This implies that the amount of time
spent in the Maoist cause is important for determining M ’s success; it does not matter if that
time input came from a rich group or a poor group. In the conflict literature, it is argued
that conflict requires both “money and bodies”. While this is no doubt true, we emphasise
the “bodies” aspect here and hence the logic for RM being the measure of time devoted to
M ’s cause rather than financial resources. This is reasonable in developing countries where
conflict — and therefore it’s impact — involves a large degree of human participation and
often with little resort to physical capital in the sense of sophisticated expensive armaments
(see Grossman (1991) and Mitra and Ray (2014) among others).
Notice that xi is the same for every individual within group i. Hence, these are to be viewed
as public goods, albeit “local” in the sense of being restricted within a group.
For M , the expected payoff involves the expected return from winning the conflict net of
any direct costs of conflict which M has to privately pay for. Let χ represent this cost; this






Intuitively, a higher entry cost (χ) serves as a potential deterrent for choosing C. If χ is
particularly high, then M might choose NC in the first stage, a situation which we feel is not
particularly relevant in light of the empirical evidence. So we assume χ << B i.e. “small”
in relation to B so that conflict is a possibility in equilibrium. Note, a higher amount of
transfers to the groups, as captured by x, may affect the chances of M ′s success but leaves
less for M ’s own “consumption”. For K, the expected payoff is:
W − cRK + (1− p)ψB
where c denotes the wage rate of the military.
2.2 Equilibrium
We use the standard notion of subgame perfection as the equilibrium concept for this game.
To be specific, an equilibrium (SPNE) of this game is given by M ’s strategy a ∈ {C,NC},
a collection of groupwise allocations by M , K’s military allocation and the group conflict
contributions, {a, xi, RK , ri}Ni=1, all of which together satisfy the following:
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(i) Each group’s contribution to conflict — ri for group i — is a best-response to {a, xi, RK}
and {rj}j 6=i.
(ii) M ’s choice of {a,x} is a best-response to {RK , {ri}Ni=1}.
(iii) K’s choice of RK is a best-response to {a, xi, ri}Ni=1.
Given the equilibrium notion adopted, we start by solving backwards.
Consider the problem faced by a typical group i in the last stage. This group takes









j 6=i rj +RK
xi
Observe that the objective function is concave in ri and hence the first order condition w.r.t
ri for an interior solution is both necessary and sufficient.









where RM = ri +
∑
j 6=i rj. Observe, if xi = 0 then the optimal choice of ri is 0. So clearly,
the above holds only for xi > 0.




B −∑Ni=1 xi)− χ
Given that we are in stage 2, χ is already paid (like a “sunk cost”) and hence M ′s choice
of x does not depend upon it. Notice, x affects M ’s payoff through two channels: (i) as a
“payment” made out of funds B, hence decreasing M ’s consumption and (ii) by mobilising
the groups to contribute to conflict, i.e., via the effect on ri for i ∈ {1, .., N}; this in turn
affects the chances of M ’s success in conflict.













In equilibrium – from M ’s perspective – the marginal return from any additional transfer
to group i must be equalized across all groups which receive a positive transfer. Otherwise
15Notice that the CES specification with regard to utility from income net of conflict contribution rules
out r∗i = 1.
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i 6= j where xi, xj > 0. This is reflected in Equation (2).
Now consider K. K’s problem can be depicted by:













Any feasible {xi, RK , ri}Ni=1 which solves equations (1), (2) and (3) constitutes an equilibrium
of this game.17
This sets the ground for our main results.
2.3 Main Results
As a starting point, consider the following symmetric case. Suppose M offers the same
transfer across all the groups – call it x. Can this be part of any equilibrium of this game?
The following observation provides the answer.
Observation 1. For every i ∈ {1, .., N}, xi = x is not possible in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is quite straight-forward. When faced with identical “re-
ward” schedules (x), the incentives of groups to supply effort for conflict (in M ’s cause) differ
by incomes. When faced with the same lottery, a poor group is willing to supply more effort
than a rich one given that the risk-aversion parameter is the same. However, what M does in
equilibrium is to equalize the marginal returns (in terms of conflict contribution) to transfers
(x) across all the groups; otherwise M could gain by shifting transfers to the group which
offers a higher marginal return. And even though poorer groups would willingly contribute
more in this case, the marginal return to M from their contribution would be lower than that
from richer ones for the same x. This is basically what prevents such symmetric schedules
from being part of any equilibrium.
This leads us to the question as to which groups actually supply more conflict effort in
equilibrium: is it the rich ones or poor ones? The discussion above suggests that poorer
16Note, RM > 0 in equilibrium implies RK > 0.
17We assume that we are in that parameter-space of our model where at least one such equilibrium exists.
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groups are willing to contribute more to conflict when offered the same returns as the rich
ones. But given the argument about equalization of ∂r
∂x
across groups which participate in
conflict, is it possible that the poorer ones are actually offered lesser (by M) than their rich
counterparts? If that is indeed so, then it is not clear whether they will end up offering
higher levels of support for M . The following observation sheds some light on this matter.
Observation 2. Take any two groups i and j such that ri, rj > 0. Then xi < xj whenever
yi < yj.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given Observation 2, one is tempted to ask if the conflict contribution by any group is
actually increasing in a group’s income. This is dealt with in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose yi < yj for i, j ∈ {1, .., N}. Then in equilibrium, ri > rj whenever
xi, xj > 0. In other words, among the groups which support M , it is the poorer ones which
contribute more for M .
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 informs us poorer groups unambiguously supply more effort in M ’s cause.
The reasoning behind the result in Observation 1 can be extended to explain this. Take two
groups, i and j with the former poorer than the latter. Starting from the equal transfers sce-
nario, there is a marginal gain from redistributing to j and away from i. This redistribution
registers an increase in overall support for M . Hence, M must set transfers so that xi < xj.
However, this difference in net transfers between i and j is not so large so as to reduce ri
to a point below rj. So the more ardent supporter (the poorer group) is paid a bit lower in
the net but not so much lower that it’s support falls below the less ardent one’s (the richer
group).
We now turn to the assessment of gains from the Maoist conflict. We are particularly
interested in identifying which groups gain more than others following the success of M in
the conflict. The next proposition deals with this issue.
Proposition 2. Suppose that M wins the conflict. Then among the groups which con-
tributed to M , it is the poorer ones who gain more in relative terms. In other words, for ri,






whenever yi < yj.
Proof. See Appendix.
By proposition 2 the transfer received as a fraction of the initial income is decreasing in
terms of initial incomes. In this sense, one could call the poorer groups the relative gainers
post-conflict conditional on M winning.
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The careful reader may point out that it is not xi
yi
which matters but one should consider
how xi fares in relation to the income net of conflict contributions, since that contribution is
made upfront and irrespective of who wins or loses. In other words, the comparison should be
based on yi(1−ri) as opposed to yi. But it is easy enough to address this. Take groups i and











and the conclusions of Proposition 2 still apply.
2.3.1 Implications in terms of poverty and inequality
Given that our empirical analysis is conducted at the district level, here we discuss the
implications of our theoretical results for district-level observables like poverty and inequality.
A natural way to translate our group-level results to the district level is to call a district
poor (respectively, rich) if it is mainly composed of low-income (respectively, high-income)
groups. Given this, the core message of Proposition 1 can be interpreted as poorer districts
being more likely to support the Maoists in the conflict. Additionally, by Proposition 2, it
is these poor, ardent supporters of M who are likely to gain more in proportionate terms.
This suggests that poverty in a district is likely to reduce (or, at least, not increase) owing
to this quid pro quo arrangement with M .
One can apply a similar logic to tease out the effect on district-level inequality. However,
here the effect is less clear since some non-poor groups may contribute to M ’s cause and
get more in return in absolute terms (see Observation 2). So it is possible that district-level
inequality may actually increase.
So far we have assumed that the Maoists behave strategically — in particular, their offers
of transfers to the groups (xi to group i) are simply to incentivise the groups to provide
the effort which maximises the Maoists expected rents from holding office. One may argue
that the Maoists need not be so self-interested; they could genuinely be concerned with the
welfare of the various groups. To consider this possibility, we solve the baseline model for
a benevolent M to check if the implications in terms of group-wise transfers, district-level
poverty and inequality are any different.
2.4 M as the benevolent planner
Let M be non-strategic in the sense that the transfers offered to the groups (namely, the
vector of xis) are not made with the view to elicit the effort levels optimal for maximising
M ’s private gains/rents. Here, the transfers are chosen to maximise a social welfare function




i=1 u(yi + xi)
s.t.
∑N
i=1 xi ≤ B
xi ≥ 0 ∀i
where u(.) is some standard increasing and concave function with u′(0) = +∞. Let the
solution to this be denoted by xp. Given this simple setup, straightforward manipulation
of the FOCs of the above problem yields the following result: for B sufficiently large, xp is
such that yi + x
p
i is equalised across all the groups.
The N groups and the incumbent (K) are assumed to be strategic as in the baseline model.
Given xpi , group i chooses ri according the FOC outlined in equation (1) as before. Also,
K’s choice of RK satisfies the FOC as given in equation (3). In this scenario, what can one
infer about the relation between yi and ri? Does the result in Proposition 1 still apply?
Proposition 3. Suppose M offers xp. Let yi < yj for some i, j ∈ {1, .., N}. Then in
equilibrium, ri > rj. In other words, among the groups which support M , it is the poorer
ones which contribute more for M .
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 informs that the core message in Proposition 1 is still valid in this setting. The
intuition behind Proposition 3 is not difficult to grasp. If poorer groups were supplying more
effort even when offered lesser (see Observation 2), then they will continue to do so when
offered more (observe, that M as a benevolent planner favours poorer groups as captured by
the structure of xp). As for Proposition 2, it is not only valid here but can be strengthened
to argue that the absolute (and of course, relative) gain to poorer groups is higher. This
follows from observing the structure of xp.
Where does this lead to as regards district-level poverty and inequality? Since the benevolent
planner favours poorer groups, this will definitely lead to a lowering of district-level poverty.
So at least in a qualitative sense, there is no difference in this regard between a strategic M
(baseline case) and a benevolent planner M . But when it comes to district-level inequality,
there is a stark distinction. In this case of a benevolent planner M , the transfers (xp)
bring down across-group disparities and hence lead to a lowering of inequality at the district
level. This stands out in sharp contrast with the case of a strategic M where district-level
inequality could even be increasing.
2.5 An Extension
Here we consider the possibility that the outcome of the civil war need not be an outright
victory for either K or M . We formally introduce the possibility of a peace agreement which
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results in a compromise between the positions adopted by the two warring groups. To keep
the analysis tractable, we assume that in the event M does not win outright (which happens
with probability (1−p)) there is an exogenous probability q ∈ [0, 1] that the peace agreement
is implemented. With the remaining probability (i.e., (1 − q)(1 − p)), K emerges the clear
winner.
Here, with probability p, M ’s platform x is implemented and with probability (1 − p)q the
peace agreement is. This brings us to the question of what the peace agreement looks like.
We envisage that the peace agreement reflects the partial concession K makes to M insofar
that he accepts to implement — to an extent — the transfers that M promised to deliver
prior to the start of the conflict. Put simply, we assume — for the sake of simplicity — that
the peace agreement outcome is θx where θ ∈ (0, 1) is an exogenous parameter.18
In this setup, the strategic considerations of all the agents change as now θx is also possible.
Thus, the optimal choice of x in the baseline model need no longer optimal in this one. The
crucial issue is whether the new equilibrium delivers the key results which we derived in the
baseline model. This is what we will pursue closely. As in the analysis of the baseline model,
we begin with the last stage of the game where the districts decide on their level of support
for M based on x.
Now, the expected payoff to a district i in a conflict is given by:
[yi(1− ri)](1−σ)
1− σ + pxi + (1− p)qθxi,
which can be expressed as:
[yi(1− ri)](1−σ)
1− σ + p(1− qθ)xi + qθxi.
Note, district i takes xi as given when making the choice. Since both q and θ are exogenous
parameters, effectively what district i aims to maximise is given by:
[yi(1− ri)](1−σ)
1− σ + p(1− qθ)xi.
This is identical to the corresponding expression in the baseline model, except for the term
(1− qθ). Specifically, it is as if ceteris paribus district i is faced with a reward of (1− qθ)xi
rather than xi. Thus, the new FOC w.r.t. ri would reflect this reduced incentive to support
18We recognise that a more holistic approach would be to endogenise the peace agreement outcome —
specifically, θ — depending upon the relative successes of K and M in the conflict. Such a detailed treatment
is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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Observe that this change (the factor (1−qθ)) affects all the districts in the same way. Hence
from a relative sense, the situation is the same as before. We will substantiate this claim in
more detail later.
Now we turn to the prior stage and examine M ’s and K’s incentives. Given the way we have
constructed the peace agreement situation, M ’s considerations are basically unaffected. In
the event of a peace agreement, it is K who remains in charge (and earns the political ‘rent’)
but he must respect M ’s platform insofar he has to implement θx. Hence, M ’s trade-off is
the same as in the baseline model.
K, on the contrary, does have incentives which are different from the ones in the baseline
model. The main change arises from the fact that K retains the possibility of earning political
rents under the peace agreement. K’s problem is given by:













The above can be written as





(1− q)ψB + q
(
B −∑ θxi)].
In effect, this is the same as maximising






where B′ ≡ [(1− q)ψB + q(B −∑ θxi)] is a parameter – from K’s perspective – in place of
ψB in the baseline model.
All of this clearly indicates that the equilibrium in this model will potentially be different from
the one in the baseline model — so the optimal x, RK and {ri}Ni=1 will be potentially different.
However, given that the change relative to the baseline model affects all districts’ strategic
considerations similarly (recall, the common factor 1− qθ), none of our main results will be
qualitatively affected. Taking note of equation (4) and comparing it with the corresponding
one in the baseline model (i.e., equation (1)) makes it clear that none of the Observations
or Propositions undergo any qualitative change.
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2.6 From theory to empirics
Our theory serves two roles: (a) it provides a framework to interpret some empirical findings
and (b) it provides us with some empirically testable predictions.
First and foremost, recall that according to our theory greater support for the Maoists
comes from poorer districts regardless of whether the Maoists behave strategically or act as
a benevolent planner (from Propositions 1 and 3). This suggests that violence will be greater
in such districts. This is in fact borne out by existing empirical studies (see e.g., Do and
Iyer (2010)). So here our theory serves role (a).
Secondly, it is precisely these poorer, conflict-prone districts who stand to gain the most
relative to their original state (in terms of transfers/implementation of development projects)
after the end of conflict when Maoists assume power (see Proposition 2). This is all the more
true if the Maoists behave as a benevolent planner rather than acting for their private gains.
Hence, regardless of which objective drives the Maoists, the conflict-prone districts will be
rewarded. This aspect of conflict-based reward is what we try to establish empirically. So
here our theory performs role (b).
Finally, one can empirically document the movement of district-level inequality and then use
our theory to pinpoint which of these two alternative objectives of the Maoists is empirically
validated. So here again our theory performs role (a).
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
For this analysis we need to combine data on incomes with the data on conflict and data
on aid allocation to Nepal. For Nepal, data on incomes is not available and we use data on
consumption expenditure that is available from the nationally representative Nepal Living
Standards Survey (NLSS).19 Three rounds have been conducted for this survey, the first was
in 1995-96 and subsequents ones were in 2003-04 and 2010-11. So we have data consumption
expenditure from the pre-conflict period using the NLSS-I and for the post conflict we use the
third wave that was conducted in 2010-11. The NLSS is conducted by the Central Bureau of
Statistics, Nepal. The sample size was 3388 households in Round I and increased to 5988 in
Round III. The sample is divided into four strata based on geographic regions of the country:
mountains, urban hills, rural hills and Terai (or lowlands). Using these data we estimate
poverty and inequality numbers for each of the 75 districts in Nepal for the different rounds.
19This is hardly a serious handicap given that the survey is nationally representative. For several developing
countries (e.g., India) such consumption expenditure surveys are used to estimate poverty levels. This
practice is widely accepted.
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We utilise two different datasets on conflict. The one which we primarily use is the same
as that in Do and Iyer (2010). It is based on information provided in the annual Human
Rights Yearbooks published by the Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), a Nepalese non-
governmental organization. We have from this dataset the total number of causalities for the
entire conflict period for each district in Nepal. We have the total number of people killed
per 1000 for each district. We also have this total broken down by the number of people
killed by the state and by the Maoists separately. The toll exacted by this conflict in terms
of human lives exceeds 13,000.20
As a robustness check, we also use data from the Global Database of Events, Language and
Tone (GDELT) Project. This project monitors the world’s broadcast, print, and web news
from nearly every corner of every country in over 100 languages and identifies the people,
locations, organizations, counts, themes, sources, and events driving our global society every
second of every day, creating a free open platform for computing on the entire world. The
GDELT 1.0 Event Database contains over a quarter-billion records covering the entire world
over 30 years (dating back to 1979) and organized into a set of tab-delimited files by date. It
collapses information broadly into date, actors, event and geographical location. We exploit
the data from here pertaining to Nepal for the time period relevant to the civil war.
For the data on the Foreign aid funded projects, we use the data available from Nepal’s
Aid Management Platform. This is a comprehensive source of data on foreign aid main-
tained at Ministry of Finance, Nepal. There is detailed information on foreign aid-funded
projects, their starting date, the funds allocated and the districts they operate in, among
other things.21 However there is some missing information in some of the entries. For some
projects listed in this database either the start date was missing or the amount allocated
was missing. From the specific project documents for such projects, we have filled in these
missing values into the database. From this source we use the total number of projects active
in a district between 1996 and 2006 and then from 2007 to 2014.22 We also use the total
funds allotted to any district.23 Along with this we also use data from the Government of
Nepal on the District Development Allocation for the years 1995 and 2003. These figures
provide us with an idea of the Government’s development allocation to the district.24
Table 1 gives the description of the main variables for the period 1996–2014.
20The population of Nepal in 1991 was around 18.57 million and in 2011 it was around 26.5 million.
21The dataset is available for download at AMP (Aid Management Platform) maintained at the website
of Ministry of Finance, Nepal. The relevant link is: http://data.opennepal.net/content/amp-aid-data-apr-
17-2014.
22A project is classified as “active” within a certain duration (say 1996 to 2006) if the “start date” for the
project lies within that period.
23First, for the calculation of the foreign aid we exclude the projects that were national in nature, since
we have no way of knowing if they targeted any specific districts. Secondly, among the projects that were
not national but covered more than one district, since we do not know the per district allocation, we use the
average amount per district by dividing the total allocation by the number of districts targeted.
24Ideally, we would have like to have annual budgetary allocations by the Government, however these







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































From the columns pertaining to 1996–2006, it is evident that per capita District Development
Allocation (DDA) is larger, on average, than the per capita foreign aid allocation during this
period. Further, there is on average less than one project (the exact number being 0.503)
active in a given year in any particular district.
In contrast, the later columns in Table 1 shows that in the post-conflict period per capita
DDA is smaller than per capita foreign aid allocation though both have risen compared to
the previous period. Note, the number of projects increased to almost 20 times of their
previous value. Here the average number of projects financed by foreign aid in a district per
year is above 9.6. These averages are indicative of the fact that in the post-conflict period
foreign aid has been a significant factor in the development in this region.
Also note that there has been a large decline in poverty across these two periods; the poverty
headcount shows a drop from about 68% to 35%. In contrast, the inequality and the polar-
ization numbers show lesser change.
We treat foreign aid funded projects at par with DDA funds which are directly allotted by
the Government of Nepal. That is to say, in our subsequent empirical analysis, we assume
that the implementation of foreign aid funded projects are, to a large extent, in the hands
of the Nepal government. The following lines from an official report from the Ministry of
Finance (Government of Nepal) in 2014 bear testimony to this (italics inserted by us):
“International development assistance continues to play a significant role in supporting socio-
economic development of Nepal. Lately, the development cooperation contributes about 20
percent in the annual budget and it is the major financing source for development projects
implemented through the Government of Nepal. In this respect, development partners’ in-
formation is equally important for planning, coordinating and effective utilization of the
development assistances ... The Ministry of Finance is putting its best efforts to enhance
aid effectiveness through greater transparency and efficient utilization of development assis-
tances.”
The last line of the quoted text betrays the concern that the foreign donors had been raising:
namely, that they could not get a clear perspective of how the funds they were sending to
Nepal were getting utilised. This strengthens our belief that the Nepalese government had
in fact significant say over the allocation and use of these funds.
We now move on to the details of our empirical strategy for the identification of the relevant
parameters.
3.2 Empirical Specification
Given the data at our disposal, we utilize both cross-sectional and panel data models.
We have a two period panel where we use data from the NLSS I (1995-96) and NLSS III
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(2010-11) to get the pre- and post-conflict levels of poverty and inequality. With these
we combine the foreign aid allocation 1996-2006 (for the first period of the panel) and the
post-conflict that is the period 2007 onwards (for the second period of the panel). Since we
are interested in the effect of conflict on various outcomes, a certain amount of lagging is
necessary. Hence for the first period, that corresponds to NLSS I (1995-96) we have zero
conflict in all districts. For the second period, we use the conflict numbers per district as
described above in Table 1; so these vary across districts and are from 1996–2006.
Using these our main specification is the standard OLS with fixed effects which can be stated
as the following:
ydt = αd + γt + βXdt + ρZdt + dt
where ydt is some measure of aid that is made available to district d at period t. This variable
can be either the number of projects funded by foreign aid in that district (averaged over
the years in that period) or it may be per-capita allocation of foreign aid to the district or
the per-capita allocation of government aid (DDA) to the district.
Xdt is a vector of variables that describe the conflict in the district (hence, one of the
following: numbers killed per 1000 in total, by the state, by the Maoists, conflict events
based on the GDELT dataset).
Zdt is a set of time-varying demographic and socio-economic controls and includes the mea-
sures of inequality or polarization. αd represents the district fixed effects while γt captures
the time effect. Here dt is the error term which is clustered at the district level.
It is important to bear in mind that all measures of conflict for every district are zero in the
first period while they vary by district in the second. So measures of aid in period 1 (which
goes from 1996 to 2006) are a function of prior conflict (zero by definition since there was
no civil conflict before 1996) and the measures of aid in period 2 (which goes from 2007 to
2014) are a function of prior conflict (so the aggregate non-zero conflict numbers from the
1996–2006 period). This lagging is necessary as we are interested in the effect of conflict on
subsequent aid distribution.25
One may view this panel specification as a sort of difference-in-differences model where the
treatment is conflict (in particular, the different intensities of conflict). The districts with
zero/low intensities of conflict can be thought of as the “control” group while those with
moderate/high levels of conflict are the “treated” group. Of course, this “treatment” is
not randomly assigned; hence, it is important to control for any pre-treatment differences
between these groups. Earlier studies have identified poverty, inequality, polarization and
25One could raise the concern that perhaps foreign aid during 1996–2006 was dampened particularly in
conflict-prone districts and hence it would be appropriate to use foreign aid data from years prior to 1996.
However, district-wise data on aid disbursement is not available prior to 1996. However, the aggregate
figures for Nepal suggest that the amount of foreign aid during the years before 1996 was not substantial,
particularly when compared to the period 2007 onwards. Moreover, we try to address the issue of potential
reverse causation by our 2-SLS IV approach.
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geography as being correlated with conflict. So, we account for these factors in our regressions
to control for “pre-treatment” differences — the time-varying factors are explicitly employed
as controls while the time-invariant ones are subsumed in the district fixed effects.
An alternative specification we use is the cross-sectional OLS model in which we examine
how the change in development aid provided to the district is affected by the intensity of
conflict that the district previously witnessed. Here we control for the initial poverty or
inequality of the district. The advantage of this specification is that we can directly see how
differences in conflict levels across the districts is related to directing more resources towards
it. Our main specification here is:
∆yd = βCd + γPd + ρZd + d
where ∆yd is the change in allocation of aid to district d, Cd is the measure of conflict
intensity for district d, Pd is the poverty or inequality in 1995 and Zd is a set of demographic
and geographic controls. Note, d denotes the error term for the cross-sectional specification.
3.3 Results
In our theoretical model, we argued that the poorer groups would provide greater support
to the Maoists, regardless of the latter’s motivations. In our empirical exercise, we interpret
the extent of conflict in the area as evidence of support for the Maoists. To see why such an
interpretation may be valid, consider the following evidence. In column 1 of Table 2, we first
present a key result from Do and Iyer (2010). Here, we see the robust positive correlation
between initial poverty and the subsequent intensity of conflict which Do and Iyer (2010)
emphasised. In fact, they interpret this as supportive of the opportunity cost view of conflict,
whereby higher poverty makes recruitment cheaper for the Maoist groups. Notice, this is
also in line with the mechanism in our theory.26
This idea is further bolstered by another result in Do and Iyer (2010) — namely, a positive
and statistically significant relation exists between the pre-conflict poverty rate (1995-96) and
the conflict deaths caused by the Government forces.27 Clearly, the State would retaliate
where resistance exists suggesting that poorer districts did have a pro-Maoist stance.
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 2 have post-conflict poverty (measured in 2010-11) as the depen-
dent variable. These regressions suggest that there is no correlation between the intensity of
conflict and subsequent district-level poverty. In other words, the positive correlation which
existed between conflict and poverty measured prior to conflict disappears when we look at
poverty levels in the post-conflict period. This suggests that those poor districts which had
experienced more conflict may have induced targeting so as to gain relative to other districts
26Additionally, Do and Iyer (2010) discuss how high levels of poverty lead to a greater level of grievances
against the government, and hence more support for the rebel groups.
27The coefficient is 0.772 and is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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[1] [2] [3]
Replication 2011 data 2011 data
Conflict deaths per 1000 population 0.042 0.024
(0.030) (0.032)
Poverty rate 1995-96 1.106***
(0.354)
Maximum elevation (’000 meters) 0.067*** 0.013* 0.029***
(0.020) (0.007) (0.010)
Proportion of forested area 1.591*** 0.129 0.231**
(0.502) (0.098) (0.096)
Access to motorable road -0.026
(0.100)
Ethnicity dummies No No Yes
Number of observations 71 70 70
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.142 0.235
Table 2: OLS cross-section: Correlations between conflict and poverty. Col-
umn 1 uses Do and Iyer (2010) data and replicates their result with conflict as the main dependent variable.
Column 2 and 3 have poverty in 2010-11 as the dependent variable. All regressions have the robust standard
errors in parentheses.
— in other words, conflict may have affected economic conditions in a direction distinct from
one involving loss and destruction (from fighting).28
We first provide a visual representation of our baseline specification. Figure 1 contains a
two–way scatterplot with a fitted line where the number of Foreign Aid-funded Projects is
plotted against the total incidences of conflict in the district; this is done after removing
district–, time– and population effects. The basic pattern indicates a positive relationship.
And this is what we test repeatedly in various specifications in the analysis that follows.29
Our baseline results for the panel specification are collected in Table 3. The dependent
variable in the first two columns is the per-capita District Development Allocation (DDA).
In the remaining columns it is based on the foreign aid allocations; specifically, in columns
(3) and (4) it is the per-capita allocation of foreign aid and in columns (5) and (6) it is
the average number of foreign-aid funded projects per year in the district. It is important
to bear in mind that the conflict measure is the same (equals 0) across the districts in the
first period and varies across the districts in the second period. Hence, the coefficient on the
conflict variable has to be interpreted accordingly.
28Another way to demonstrate this lack of correlation in the post-conflict period is by looking at the effect
on poverty in a panel setting in the spirit of a difference-in differences approach that we adopt. This can be
found in Table 13 in the Appendix.
29The Appendix contains similar figures for two other measures of conflict: casualties by the State and
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Figure 1: Number of Foreign Aid-funded Projects and Total Conflict. The
vertical axis plots the residual of number of Foreign Aid-funded Projects in the period following conflict after
district–, time– and population effects have been removed. The horizontal axis plots the total incidences of
conflict in the district. So each district appears twice in the figure (once for every period).
DDA Aid Allocation Aid: No. of Projects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Conflict deaths per 1000 population 0.287 1.343 19.974 19.841 0.836*** 0.856***
(1.116) (1.450) (17.712) (15.815) (0.232) (0.199)
Av. Per-capita expenditure -0.002** 0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Headcount of poverty -13.316* 50.408* -1.281
(7.553) (30.001) (1.503)
Ethnic group sizes N Y N Y N Y
Population Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 140 140 140 140 140 140
Adjusted R2 0.305 0.479 0.224 0.344 0.941 0.952
Table 3: OLS Fixed Effects regressions. Sources and Notes: Columns [1] and [2] have DDA
per capita as the dependent variable. Columns [3] and [4] have per capita foreign aid allocation and columns
[5] and [6] have the number of projects as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered by
district are given in parentheses.
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The results, by and large, show a positive association between intensity of conflict and the
aid allocation. This is particularly valid for the regressions with the number of foreign-
aided projects as the dependent variable (columns (5) and (6)). The positive and significant
coefficients indicate that as conflict increases within a district there is an increase in foreign-
aid funded projects allotted to that district. This is tantamount to saying that those districts
which experienced greater levels of conflict had more foreign-aid funded projects allotted to
them afterwards.
One needs to weigh the different outcome variables in terms of their ability to capture what
we intend to measure. Both DDA and the foreign aid allocations are allocations and not
actual expenditure undertaken whereas the number of foreign-aid funded projects refer to
projects which are active in the districts. In this sense, the latter is a more accurate measure
of transfers made to the districts. In our view, the concerns of endogeneity are substantially
lower in the regressions with foreign aid variables as compared to DDA funds. Notice, we
lag the conflict measures so as to mitigate concerns of reverse causation in any case. But one
may argue that conflict took place — in part — to capture these funds as warring groups
need financial resources during conflict. In this respect, using the foreign aid data (rather
than DDA) is desirable because of two reasons: (i) There was very little foreign aid in the
period before/during conflict while the aid increased substantially after the end of conflict
and (ii) the extent of appropriation by the contesting groups must be lower for foreign aid
as compared to DDA as there is some amount of accountability to the foreign donors.
DDA Aid Allocation Aid: No. of Projects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Killed by state per 1000 population 1.632 23.481 1.074***
(1.935) (19.990) (0.280)
Killed by Maoists per 1000 population 5.065 79.222 2.989***
(4.680) (56.708) (0.784)
Av. Per-capita expenditure -0.002** -0.002** 0.002 0.002* -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Headcount of poverty -13.330* -12.993* 50.539 54.739* -1.308 -1.050
(7.567) (7.495) (31.630) (30.506) (1.534) (1.445)
Ethnic group sizes Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 140 140 140 140 140 140
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.481 0.316 0.389 0.951 0.952
Table 4: OLS Fixed effects Regressions: Alternative definitions of conflict.
Sources and Notes: Columns [1] and [2] have DDA per capita as the dependent variable. Columns [3] and [4]
have per capita foreign aid allocation and columns [5] and [6] have the number of projects as the dependent
variable. Robust standard errors clustered by district are given in parentheses.
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One could ask how conflict support for Maoists in the theory maps to casualties from conflict
in the data. In particular, one could argue that casualties suffered by the Maoists at the
hands of the State is a better proxy. Alternatively, one could argue that casualties inflicted
by the Maoists actually constitute a better measure. We are agnostic about this and hence
report results for all the three different measures: total, killed by State and killed by Maoists.
Table 4 presents some such regressions estimated with conflict variables that measure number
of people killed by state and Maoists separately. These regressions show that our basic
relation between conflict intensity and aid-related variables are unchanged: larger the rise in
conflict (howsoever measured) over the two periods, the greater is the increase in foreign-aid
funded projects allotted to that district.
Recognizing that inequality or polarization within a district may affect both the intensity
of conflict and the number of foreign-aided projects, we include different measures of such
in our regressions. Table 14 (in the appendix) shows that our results are robust to using
several other measures of poverty, inequality and polarization.
One concern may be that the link between conflict intensity and aid-induced projects that
we document may be explained by a story linking poverty and aid allocation. So, one need
not have the implicit quid pro quo theory that we propose. Specifically, one may argue that
once Maoists joined the government they influenced aid allocation in a manner so as to
benefit poorer districts: simply directing aid to those who perhaps need it the most. Given
the positive correlation between conflict intensity and pre-conflict poverty, this explanation
would be entirely consistent with our reported findings so far.
We try to check whether it is conflict intensity per se which affects aid-induced projects or
whether conflict is simply proxying for poverty. In our regressions (see e.g., Tables 3 and 4) we
explicitly control for some measure of poverty alongside our measures of conflict. It turns out
that the coefficient on the poverty variable is not stable whereas the sign and significance of
the coefficient on the conflict variables is stable across the different specifications. In Table
14 (in the appendix), however the coefficient on poverty is not significant across various
specifications in stark contrast to the positive and significant coefficients on the conflict
variable. These results suggest that it is not poverty via the channel of conflict which
explains the pattern of aid-funded project growth but conflict intensity in and of itself.
Rather than looking at all the projects collectively, one could divide them according to the
sector towards which the funds are targeted. So we have divided the total into seven (disjoint)
categories: (i) agriculture, (ii) communication, (iii) infrastructure, (iv) education, (v) health,
(vi) institutional and (vii) general development. Such an exercise serves two purposes. First,
we can examine the sector-wise heterogeneity if any. Next, we are interested to see whether
the effects are largely driven by reconstruction efforts. Once could argue that conflict-
prone areas suffered heavy damages to infrastructure and institutional buildings (government
offices, police stations) and hence it could be rebuilding of these which is driving our results














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We see that the results for the number of projects (Tables 3, 4 and 14) are replicated for
most sectors except for three sectors: ‘infrastructure’, ‘institution’ and the ‘communications’
sectors. In the ‘infrastructure’ and ‘institution’ categories we see no statistical significance
at the 10% level. This serves to allay our concern that conflict-damaged reconstruction
projects are driving our results. For the ‘communications’ sector we see a significant effect
but with the opposite sign. Specifically, higher conflict resulted in lesser projects pertaining
to communication. One explanation for this could be that the Maoist parties felt that
they needed to broadcast their ideology and agenda to places which they had lesser access
to earlier (and hence these places were involved in the conflict to a lesser extent). Some
evidence points towards such a policy (see Miklian (2009)).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Conflict deaths per 1000 population 0.692*** 0.544**
(0.245) (0.238)
Deaths caused by state per 1000 population 0.577*
(0.294)
Deaths caused by Maoists per 1000 population 2.462**
(0.933)
Headcount of poverty in 1995-96 -1.272 -2.235 -2.221 -2.413
(2.071) (2.421) (2.441) (2.369)
Linguistic polarization 1995-96 0.754 0.770 0.600
(1.569) (1.582) (1.547)
Caste Polarization 1995-96 0.106 0.269 0.205
(4.256) (4.315) (4.105)
Infant mortality 1995-96 0.028** 0.029** 0.026*
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Elevation max -0.544*** -0.541*** -0.549***
(0.132) (0.132) (0.130)
No. of Project 1996-2006 0.256 0.311* 0.303* 0.318*
(0.192) (0.169) (0.170) (0.166)
Population Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 70 70 70 70
Adjusted R2 0.122 0.287 0.278 0.308
Table 6: Cross-sectional OLS regressions.The change in foreign aid (number of projects)
over the two periods (2007–2014 and 1996–2006) is the dependent variable in all columns. Robust standard
errors are given in parentheses.
We now turn to the estimates from our cross-sectional regressions. Table 6 contains some
of the main results. In all of the reported regressions in this table, the dependent variable
is the change in the number of foreign aid–funded projects. The main explanatory variable
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of interest is Conflict deaths per 1000 population and this is from the period 1996–2006. We
see that districts with higher intensity of conflict had more foreign aid projects allotted to
them. This is true for all the three different measures of conflict intensity based on casualties
(total, killed by the State and killed by the Maoists).
The results are also robust to alternative measures of poverty and inequality (see Table 15
in the appendix).
3.3.1 Motives of the Maoists
Our theory considered two alternative motivations for the Maoists — (i) the clientelistic,
rent-seeking agent who provides conflict “compensation” strategically and (ii) the benevolent
social planner who tries to maximise aggregate citizen welfare. No doubt, the truth is
somewhere in between these two poles but one of our aims in this paper is to uncover in
which direction it lies.
According to our theory, if M is indeed driven largely by private concerns then poor groups
who supply more conflict effort should receive compensation but not as much as their richer
M– supporting counterparts. This, in turn, implies that the effect of conflict support on
poverty will be limited under motivation (i). On the other hand, if the Maoists were to behave
as the benevolent planner then they would target more resources to the poor conflict-prone
groups which would reduce poverty.
A similar logic extends to the issue of the impact of conflict on inequality: an M driven by
private gains would have limited impact on inequality (see Observation 2 and Proposition 1).
However a benevolent planner-type M would target more resources towards poorer groups
in an absolute sense and if anything reduce inequalities.
In Table 7, we report some results where the dependent variable is some measure of poverty
or inequality (both measured at the district–level) and the main independent variable of
interest is our familiar measure of conflict (deaths). In columns (1) — (6) of this table,
the coefficient on the conflict variable is not statistically significant even at the 10% level.
This lack of correlation between conflict-proneness and poverty/inequality suggests that the
allocation of aid less driven by concerns of social welfare and more by strategic considerations.
To push this line of argument further, we look at another commonly used proxy of economic
activity at the sub-national level — namely, the amount of night-time lights. Our measure
of night-time light is from satellite images from the US Air Force DMSP and its Operational
Linescan System.30
30The satellites circle the Earth 14 times each day and record Earth-based lights with their Operational
Linescan System for grid cells of 30 arc-seconds (corresponding to approximately 1 square kilometer). The
entire planet between latitudes 65 degrees N and 65 degrees S is covered. From 1992 and onwards, these














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Several recent studies have provided empirical evidence showing that night-time light cor-
responds well to economic activity and well-being in other contexts (see e.g., Henderson,
Storeygard, and Weil (2012), Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), Alesina, Michalopou-
los, and Papaioannou (2016)). Based on the data we have, we interpret the average amount
of light as an indicator for general economic development.
One key advantage of this measure is that it captures all potential variations even in the
short-run. Hence, in principle it is less sluggish than other measures of economic activity/
well-being. So while poverty and inequality may be slow to change, the measure of night-time
lights would be able to pick up short-term variations.
To construct this variable, we take the average annual night-time lights over 3 years for each
round in each of the districts in our sample. Specifically, for the first wave (correspond-
ing to NLSS I in 1995-1996) we take the average over 1993–1995 and for the second wave
(corresponding to NLSS III in 2010-2011) we use the average over 2010–2012.31 We report
the effect of conflict on night-time lights in column (7) of Table 7. As with the case of the
various poverty and inequality measures, night-time lights does not seem to be affected by
the extent of conflict recorded in the district. For the sake of completeness, we re-run the
baseline regressions reported in Table 3 with our variable night-time lights in place of the
headcount of poverty measure. The results are substantially similar — see Table 12 in the
Appendix.
All in all, these results suggest a strategic motive for the Maoists rather than that of a
benevolent social planner’s.
3.4 Additional robustness checks
3.4.1 The role of elections
It may be argued that the distribution of resources may be basically dependent upon how
successful the left parties were in the elections post–conflict. In particular, in places the
left were electorally successful in relation to their pre-conflict position there would be higher
channeling of funds and projects. If the success of such parties were indeed higher in dis-
tricts which witnessed more conflict, then our results could simply be a reflection of greater
targeting by the left rather than any (implicit) compensation for conflict–support.
We use data from two elections: one in 1994 which is prior to the start of conflict and the
other in 2008 which is after the conflict had ended.
We start by creating different measures of left electoral presence. In particular, we employ
two definitions of “leftist” parties: one is a rather stringent one while the other is more
31It is important to bear in mind that all measures of conflict for every district are zero in the first period
while they vary by district in the second; hence, the timing of the night-time lights variable.
31
lenient.
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Conflict deaths per 1000 population 0.894*** 0.915*** 0.801*** 0.848***









Av. Per-capita expenditure -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Headcount of poverty -1.099 -1.036 -1.180 -1.158
(1.717) (1.758) (1.721) (1.759)
Ethnic group sizes Y Y Y Y
Population Y Y Y Y
Time dummy Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 138 138 138 138
Adjusted R2 0.951 0.951 0.951 0.951
Table 8: OLS Fixed Effects regressions: Left electoral presence. Sources and
Notes: All columns have the number of projects as the dependent variable. The left parties performance
is measured in four different ways; first, we categorise the left parties into two groups on the basis of their
stated ideologies — Left and Ultra-left. Next, we look at their share of votes in the district and also the
number of seats they won in a district. We utilise the 1994 and the 2008 elections for these measures. Robust
standard errors clustered by district are given in parentheses.
We call a party “Ultra-Left” if it stood for militant leftist ideology and in fact were active
in the Maoist war. A party is coded as “Left” if it simply promoted a leftist ideology
without necessarily being directly involved with the Maoist war. Note, only a breakaway
faction of the Communist Party of Nepal (led by Prachanda–Bhattarai) actually took up
armed struggle; so such a faction would be both Ultra-left and Left while a “moderate”
party like Communist Party of Nepal (UML) is coded as Left but not Ultra-left. Apart from
CPN (Maoist), we included the following parties under Ultra Left because they were legal
fronts for more extremist leftist ideology: Janamorcha and Rastriya Janamorcha (for the
2008 elections) and Samyukta Janamorcha Nepal and Nepal Janavadi Morcha (for the 1994
elections).
For each of these Left/Ultra-left parties in each election (1994 and 2008), we created two
32
different variables at the district level: one is the share of seats won by these parties and the
other is the total share of votes won by these parties. These two measures are indicators of
the electoral presence of the Left/Ultra-left parties in each election period.
Table 8 contains some regressions where these different measures of Left/Ultra-left electoral
presence is included as an additional control. Columns (1) and (2) have the shares of the seats
won by the Left group and the Ultra-left group respectively as the political control variables.
Columns (3) and (4) use the shares of votes of these parties. Interestingly, the coefficients
on these variables are not statistically significant at the 10% level in these specifications.32
Notice, the inclusion of such variables does not alter our main findings in any way: the
coefficient on the conflict variable remains positive and significant throughout.
3.4.2 Alternative measures of conflict
As mentioned earlier, we also use a second source of data on conflict to validate our results.
This is from the Global Database of Events, Language and Tone (GDELT) Project. For
our purposes, we created (a subset of) the GDELT database of events pertinent to internal
conflict in Nepal from 1995–2011. The database consists of 37,689 observations33. We use
the following GDELT event codes: 07 (“Provide Aid”), 14 (“Protest”), 15 (“Exhibit Force
Posture”), 18 (“Assault”), 19 (“Fight”) and 20 (“Use Unconventional Mass Violence”).34
Table 9 is the exact counterpart of the table containing the baseline results (Table 3); so
there is a column-by-column correspondence.
From Table 9, we can see that the basic pattern that has been documented so far continues to
hold up when using this new measure of conflict intensity. Moreover, the coefficients on the
conflict variable are positive and significant for not just the number of foreign aid-funded
projects; in fact, it is so for the Nepal government’s development funds (DDA) and the
foreign aid allocations variables as well (see columns (1)—(6)). Overall, this serves to allay
our concerns as to whether the relation between conflict (which we measure by casualties in
the INSEC dataset) and aid was owing to some specific features of the INSEC dataset.
We also replicate the results for the sectoral divisions (a la Table 5) to check whether a
similar pattern holds. It turns out that even when using the GDELT data, the effects are
quite similar. The table is provided in the Appendix (see Table 16). Next, we check whether
the electoral performance of the Left parties have any influence on the coefficients on the
GDELT–based conflict variables. We present regressions which are in the spirit of Table
8. Table 17 in the appendix contains some of these results. The coefficient on the conflict
32This of course does not establish that political considerations did not have a role. We plan to take up
this matter seriously in a related paper.
33While the original database consisted of 42,221 observations pertaining to the above-mentioned event
codes in Nepal, only those geo-coded according to the geographical co-ordinate system within the Nepalese
territory have been selected for analysis.
34See the GDELT codebook here: http://gdeltproject.org/data/lookups/CAMEO.eventcodes.txt
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DDA Aid Allocation Aid: No. of Projects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Conflict (GDELT) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003* 0.008* 0.000*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Av. Per-capita expenditure -0.000 0.006* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Headcount of poverty -8.194 68.070 -0.265
(6.246) (45.512) (1.505)
Ethnic group sizes N Y N Y N Y
Population Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 140 140 140 140 140 140
Adjusted R2 0.808 0.815 0.084 0.237 0.938 0.953
Table 9: OLS Fixed Effects regressions: Alternative Measure of Conflict.
Sources and Notes: Conflict is measured using data from GDELT. Columns [1] and [2] have DDA per capita
as the dependent variable. Columns [3] and [4] have per capita foreign aid allocation and columns [5] and
[6] have the number of projects as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered by district are
given in parentheses.
variable using the GDELT data continue to be positive and significant as in the baseline case
(Table 8); moreover, it is true also for the Nepal government’s development funds (DDA)
and the foreign aid allocations variables.
3.5 2-SLS IV analysis
We have so far interpreted our OLS fixed effects regression results as a difference-in-differences
analysis in the spirit that conflict-related deaths is like a “treatment”. To account for the
fact that this “treatment” is not randomly assigned across districts, we tried to control for
various factors which are systematically different in these two sets of districts: namely, the
treated and the control.35 To further move in the direction of a causal interpretation of
conflict on resource–redistribution, we employ a two-stage least squares IV analysis.
One of the important sources of funds for the Maoists came from the control of timber
smuggling to India (see ICG (2005)). This idea is echoed in the following excerpt:
“The Nepal army and the Maoists needed forest products to maintain their presence in rural
35We controlled for various correlates of conflict as identified in the literature. There is no possibility of
checking for a “parallel trends” assumption due to the lack of disaggregated data on foreign aid prior to
1996.
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areas. They needed fuel-wood and grazing for animals and timber for construction, whilst the
Maoists needed timber to sell as a source of revenue” (LFP (2010)).
This is precisely the channel we seek to exploit in terms of developing an instrument for our
conflict measure(s) at the district level. The returns from smuggling timber to India would
naturally depend on the prices for the various types of timber in India. Moreover, the ecology
(specifically, the elevation and vegetation) varies considerably across the different districts of
Nepal. However, the type(s) of timber a district can offer is clearly a time-invariant entity.
However, the prices of these — in India — do vary over time. Thus, a weighted index of
these prices at the district-level — where the weights come from the proportion of the district
vegetation falling into one of the ecological categories (more on this below) — would be a
measure of the funding sources of the Maoists from the district at a point in time. Insofar
the price movements in timber in India are independent of the aid disbursements/targetted
transfers in Nepal (our outcome variables), such a weighted index would be exogenous and
hence allow for improved identification of the effects. It is plausible to assume that price
movements for different types of timber in India are driven by factors internal to India rather
than economic conditions in Nepal.
The International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) has established a
Regional Database System (RDS) that acts as a central data repository for different thematic
areas in the Hindu Kush Himalayan (HKH) region and provides access to these data through
the RDS portal. The map of the ecology of Nepal prepared by ICIMOD provides the digital
polygon data of ecology (elevation and vegetation zones) for the country in 2003.36 This
dataset has been used to assess district-wise spread of timber resources in Nepal. To that end,
the vegetation types in the ICIMOD dataset were broadly classified further into coniferous,
non-coniferous and non-coniferous tropical forests.37 The International Tropical Timber
Organization (ITTO) divides the price of timber into these very same categories (coniferous
trees, non-coniferous trees and non-coniferous tropical trees).38 We use these price data along
with the above-mentioned ecology data to construct our proposed instrument for district-
level conflict.
This brings us to the question as to the partial correlation between our proposed instrument
and the measures of conflict. Say, a rise in the price of the relevant timber types in India
imply greater resources for the Maoists. But what is the resultant effect on conflict? Does it
increase or decrease? In principle, the effect could go either way. It would depend upon the
military strategies of the warring groups. Thus, we treat it as an empirical question which
would resolve itself in the first-stage regressions.
The idea behind our instrument is similar in spirit to the strategy employed in Libois (2016)
36This is based on the Dobremez Maps series published in France from 1970 to 1985. (Website publication
date of the map: 2014-11-04T15:00:24, Standard Name: ISO 19115:2003/19139)
37The classification has been performed using the ecological tables provided here:
http://lib.icimod.org/record/22584/files/c attachment 178 3632.pdf.
38We are grateful to Francois Libois for sharing the data on the timber prices.
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but there are some clear distinctions. Libois (2016) constructs a similar variable at the
Village Development Committee (VDC) level and interacts this variable with the inverse of
the distance of the VDC to India. The instrument in his case is this interaction term and
not simply the weighted index which we use.
Now we turn to our results from this 2SLS-IV analysis. Table 10 contains some of the
results. Column 1 reports the first-stage regression where conflict intensity is regressed on
our weighted index ((log) Value of Wood) and the other controls. The coefficient on the
instrument is negative and significant with an F− statistic above the conventional threshold
of 10. This indicates that our instrument is not weak.
The negative partial correlation seems to suggest that areas where the Maoists got access to
more funds (“deeper pockets”) — through an increase in the timber prices in India — saw a
reduction in violence. This is akin to a “deterrent” effect as perhaps the government forces
thought best against taking the battle to the (financial) strongholds of the insurgents.
The second-stage results are reported, in turn, for all three outcome variables: the Nepal
government’s budgetary development allocation (DDA), the foreign aid allocation and the
average number of foreign aid-funded projects. Columns 2 – 4 report the results. In all of
them, the effect of conflict on aid howsoever measured, is positive and significant. Moreover,
it is so for the Nepal government’s budgetary development allocation (DDA) and the foreign
aid allocation variables which is contrast with the previous OLS fixed effects results. Columns
5 and 6 report the results for conflict deaths by the State and by the Maoists, respectively,
for the average number of foreign aid-funded projects as the outcome variable. We note that
basic results are the same. Observe that the F− statistics from their first-stage regressions
are again in excess of 10.
Table 18 in the appendix contains regressions pertaining to conflict deaths by the State and
by the Maoists, respectively, for the other two outcome variables: the Nepal government’s
budgetary development allocation (DDA) and the foreign aid allocation. The results are in
line with the ones discussed above.
The timber industry is quite relevant as providing a means of livelihood in parts of Nepal.
This suggests that – in principle – there could be a potential direct link between timber
prices and aid allocation, thereby threatening our exclusion restriction. Moreover, our first-
stage partial correlation is negative and significant (see column (1) in Table 10) which could
be consistent with the hypothesis regarding a direct link which espouses that higher timber
prices implies less aid. To test the validity of our instrument, we focus on the effect of timber
prices on aid directly in areas with little or no conflict — i.e., we test for a reduced form
relationship between the two variables (timber values and aid) in a context free of conflict.
The idea is that if the reduced form relationship is not statistically significant, our doubts
regarding the validity of the exclusion restriction would be assuaged.39



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We carry out precisely this exercise and the results are reported in Table 11. Here, we only
focus on districts where the conflict measure is below 0.5; the mean of this variable in our
sample is 0.951 (see Table 1).40 As one can see in Table 11, in none of the specifications is the
coefficient on our instrument (log) Value of wood even close to being statistically significant
at the 10% level. This stands in sharp contrast with the significant 2SLS-IV results in Table
10. Hence, this exercise helps mitigate our concerns as regards the exclusion restriction of
our instrument (log) Value of wood, and bolsters our faith in the 2SLS-IV analysis.
DDA DDA Aid Alloc. Projects
[1] [2] [3] [4]
(log) Value of wood 5.272 -10.241 -7.121 -3.442
(31.123) (31.472) (7.457) (3.941)
Av. Per-capita expenditure -0.004** 0.000 -0.000**
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Headcount of poverty -12.138 12.334 3.375
(24.885) (7.619) (3.012)
Ethnic group sizes N Y Y Y
Population Y Y Y Y
Time dummy Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.281 0.596 0.637 0.970
Table 11: Aid allocation and the Value of Timber: OLS Fixed Effects re-
gressions. Sources and Notes: The sample is restricted to districts which experienced little or no
conflict. Columns [1] and [2] have DDA per capita as the dependent variable. Columns [3] and [4] have per
capita foreign aid allocation and the number of projects, respectively, as the dependent variable. Robust
standard errors clustered by district are given in parentheses.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the role conflict plays in determining the distribution of economic
resources after conflict has ended. Most studies on conflict have highlighted factors which
precipitate conflict but the literature on the economic consequences of conflict is relatively
sparse. Our study of the Maoist uprising and its aftermath in Nepal aims to close this gap.
40This reduces our sample to 50 as opposed to the usual 140.
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Our theory combines political factors with economic ones to capture some salient aspects
of the Maoist uprising. In particular, we derive that it is poorer groups who are the bigger
contributors to the Maoist cause; this is true even absent of any ideological ties between
low-income groups and the Maoists. And more importantly, our model also delivers that it
is these poor “rebellious” groups who stand to gain more — not in an absolute sense — but
in a relative one, in the event of a successful Maoist revolution. So conflict may not bring
about an entire “reversal of fortunes” but will serve to help these groups in reducing poverty.
We also examine these predictions empirically. First, we replicate the findings from Do
and Iyer (2010) who have documented that poorer districts experienced higher levels of
conflict. Next, we use data on consumption expenditure that is available from the nationally
representative Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS) over several years: particularly, from
years before and after the decade long Maoist war. This is combined with various data
on different kind of district level allocations (for public infrastructure development and the
like). Specifically, we exploit the data on the Foreign aided projects which is available from
Nepal’s Aid Management Platform. Using these data and performing both panel level and
cross-sectional analysis, we consistently find that districts which experienced higher levels of
conflict (during the decade-long Maoist war) were more likely to have a greater number of
foreign aided projects in years after the war even when controlling for the poverty rate at
the district level.
So is this really a “reward” for supporting the eventual victors? Or perhaps the victors
would have targeted the poorer districts in any case, in the spirit of the benevolent social
planner? Our empirical results suggest that the “reward” mechanism seems more plausible
than the “benevolent social planner” story: conflict intensity has an independent effect on
the number of foreign aid funded projects even aside from the effect poverty has. Also, the
patterns in district-level inequality hint at the opportunistic motives of the Maoists.
From a normative point of view, should one despair? While our work does not directly
deal with welfare analysis, we believe that the answer is in the negative. First, it is hard to
argue that greater reductions in poverty for the poorer parts of the country is reducing social
welfare whatever may be the means to secure this. But that said, whether such redistribution
is happening at the expense of overall growth or not is an open question. Secondly, to the
extent that the ushering in of multi-party democracy is beneficial for the expression of certain
political, social and economic freedoms, such “conflict” may not be outright detrimental.
Hence, compensation for the conflict-contributors may well be justified. Of course, the
question as to whether clientelistic relations will be further re-inforced between the Maoists
and their supporters from these “core” groups remains unanswered. These questions, among
others, remain open to further probing.
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Proof of Observation 1: Note that xi = 0 for every i ∈ {1, .., N} is not possible in equilibrium
as M can gain by offering a infinitesimal amount to any group. So we can restrict attention
to xi = x > 0. Suppose there exists such x that this is part of an equilibrium. This implies









The above equation defines ri as an implicit function of x. Differentiating both sides of the


































But this violates the equilibrium condition (consult equation (2)) that ∂ri
∂x
must be equalized
across all i since xi = x > 0. Therefore, it must be that ri is also equalized across all i.
However, take any yi, yj such that yi 6= yj. Then by equation (5), ri 6= rj. This leads to a
contradiction and hence establishes the observation.
Proof of Observation 2: Start with the FOC w.r.t ri which is given by equation (1). Differ-








































by xi ≥ xj. Since yi < yj, it must be that ri > rj for the above relation to hold. But this
leads to a contradiction. Therefore, it must be that xi < xj in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1: By Observation 2, we have xi < xj whenever yi < yj. Using this





yields ri > rj thus
completing the proof.





































where the last inequality follows from yi < yj and σ ∈ (0, 1).





thus establishing the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3: Take groups i, j such that yi < yj. Since yi + x
p
i = yj + x
p
j , we have
xpi > x
p














Note, the LHS of the above equation is smaller than 1 while the first term on the RHS
exceeds 1. This implies (
1−rj
1−ri )




























































































































































0 1 2 3 4 5
Incidence of Conflict by State
Figure 2: Number of Foreign Aid-funded Projects and Conflict (deaths by
State). The vertical axis plots the residual of number of Foreign Aid-funded Projects in the period
following conflict after district–, time– and population effects have been removed. The horizontal axis plots























































































































































0 .5 1 1.5
Incidence of Conflict by Maoists
Figure 3: Number of Foreign Aid-funded Projects and Conflict (deaths by
Maoists). The vertical axis plots the residual of number of Foreign Aid-funded Projects in the period
following conflict after district–, time– and population effects have been removed. The horizontal axis plots
the total casualties caused by the Maoists in the district. So each district appears twice in the figure (once
for every period).
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DDA Aid Allocation Aid: No. of Projects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Conflict deaths per 1000 population 0.287 1.290 19.974 20.844 0.836*** 0.847***
(1.116) (1.172) (17.712) (16.758) (0.232) (0.186)
Av. Per-capita expenditure -0.001* 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Night-time lights 11.998** 3.360 0.907
(5.144) (5.633) (0.728)
Ethnic group sizes N Y N Y N Y
Population Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 140 140 140 140 140 140
Adjusted R2 0.305 0.599 0.224 0.318 0.941 0.953
Table 12: OLS Fixed Effects regressions with Night-time lights. Sources and
Notes: Columns [1] and [2] have DDA per capita as the dependent variable. Columns [3] and [4] have per
capita foreign aid allocation and columns [5] and [6] have the number of projects as the dependent variable.
Robust standard errors clustered by district are given in parentheses.
Poverty Inequality
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Headcount Poverty Gap Sq. Gap Gini Atkinson Foster-Wolfson NTL
Conflict deaths per 1000 population 0.003 -0.011 -0.011 0.001 -0.000 -0.010 -0.043
(0.016) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.015) (0.041)
Ethnic group sizes Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
Adjusted R2 0.819 0.772 0.677 0.024 0.035 0.299 0.664
Table 13: Poverty and Inequality (without Av. Per-capita Expenditure): OLS
Fixed Effects regressions. Sources and Notes: Columns [1] — [3] have different measures of
(district-level) poverty as the dependent variable, specifically, the Headcount Ratio, the Poverty Gap and
the Poverty Squared Gap. Columns [4] — [6] have different measures of (district-level) inequality as the
dependent variable, specifically, the Gini, the Atkinson Index and the Foster-Wolfson index of polarisation
Column [7] has the average night-time lights as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DDA Aid Allocation Aid: No. of Projects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Conflict (GDELT) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.008* 0.008* 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Left seatshare -0.226** -1.455 -0.010
(0.100) (1.112) (0.032)
Ultra-Left seatshare -0.122 0.285 -0.032
(0.236) (0.752) (0.070)
Av. per-capita expenditure -0.000 -0.000 0.008* 0.006* 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Headcount of poverty -8.448 -8.720 80.820 74.997 0.093 0.181
(6.508) (6.459) (52.185) (49.883) (1.694) (1.716)
Ethnic group sizes Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 138 138 138 138 138 138
Adjusted R2 0.832 0.815 0.288 0.236 0.952 0.952
Table 17: OLS Fixed Effects regressions: Left electoral presence. Sources and
Notes: Conflict is measured using the GDELT dataset. Columns [1] and [2] have DDA per capita as the
dependent variable. Columns [3] and [4] have per capita foreign aid allocation and columns [5] and [6] have
the number of projects as the dependent variable. We categorise the left parties into two groups on the basis
of their stated ideologies — Left and Ultra-left. Next, we look at their share of seats they won in a district.
We utilise the 1994 and the 2008 elections for these measures. Robust standard errors clustered by district
are given in parentheses.
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